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Prisons today are facing many challenges. Chief among these challenges are 
overcrowding and increased cost of incarceration. Private prisons are starting to reemerge 
as an alternative to the public prisons and the problems accompanying them.
Private prisons existed in the 1800s, however the first era of private prisons was not a 
big success. Many problems existed, but at the top of this list was corruption. Today with 
the reemergence of private prisons, there are many critics of privatization. These 
opponents have a variety of arguments ranging fi*om the cost o f these facilities to fear of 
corruption. Thus an assessment o f the viability of private prisons is necessary.
There are two types o f private facilities, not-for-profit and for-profit. As the present time 
is showing a need for private facilities, the future is uncertain on which type of private 
facility is better for our society. Thus, an assessment on not-for-profit and for-profit 
facilities is necessary. Part of this assessment will take place by examining a proposed 
not-for-profit facility in Southwest Montana.
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INTRODUCTION
. . . where on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh 
will be tom from his breasts, arms, thighs, and calves with 
red hot pincers, his right hand holding the knife with which 
he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and on 
those places where the flesh will be tom away, poured 
molten lead, boiling oil, buming resin, wax and sulphur 
melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by 
four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, 
reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds (Foucalt 
1995:12).
This gruesome account of an eighteenth century condemnation characterizes 
the dramatic shift in the administration of punishment. Within these two centuries of 
change, there have been many experiments with different forms of punishment. By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, brutal acts of torture and public execution were 
slowly disappearing. New forms of punishment were replacing the old; among the new 
was imprisonment. Today as we approach the twenty-first century, imprisonment is 
the dominant form of punishment. Prisons are located all over the world. From a 
nation of great wealth like the United States to the poorest of third world countries, 
some form of imprisonment exists. The worlds’ prisons are very diverse and it is likely 
that no two are alike. However, one concept is universal among all of them: They take 
away an individual’s freedom.
As with any form of punishment or correction, controversy surrounds the
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administration of prisons. The debates concerning imprisonment are numerous and 
complex. Imprisonment is by no means a perfect form of punishment. Many 
adjustments to past problems have been implemented. However solutions to existing 
problems are continuously being sought. Perhaps the biggest problem that prisons in 
the United States are facing today is overcrowding. The United States is one of the 
world leaders in per capita incarceration. In terms of total numbers, the U.S. has about 
1.6 million people in a state or federal prison on a given day (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 1997). In addition to this, there are roughly 500,000 people in local jails on a 
given day (Criminal Justice Institute 1995). The total number of people in state or 
federal prisoners at mid-year of 1996 has doubled since 1990 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 1997). The total cost of incarceration today is well over 30 billion compared 
to just 2.2 billion in 1975 (Criminal Justice Institute 1995). For years, scholars, policy 
makers, activists, and correctional leaders have been looking for new ways to deal 
with the crisis of a bulging inmate population and the resulting economic 
encumbrance. The contracting of prisons by the state to private entities is the growing 
trend for dealing with this crisis.
The term “private prison” refers to a place of confinement that is privately 
owned, operated, or managed under control by the government (Logan 1990). Whether 
or not one agrees or disagrees with the idea of private prisons, it is a growing reality in 
the U.S. and other countries. The U.K., Australia, and Canada also have prisons that 
are contracted to private organizations by the government. As indicated in Figure 1, in 
1995 there were 104 fully operational private facilities, 92 of these are in the U.S.
Australia
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Figure I. Distribution o f  Private Prisons in 1995. (LIS Inc. 1996).
The trend towards privatization seems irreversible (Harding 1997). With 
privatization playing a larger role annually, we need to be confident that it is a 
legitimate alternative to public run facilities. In addition, there is a need to find out what 
type of private prison is best. “Types” of prisons refers to private prisons for-profit 
versus private prisons not-for-profit. A private prison for-profit is a prison whose main 
goal is to make money. It is a business. A private prison not-for-profit is a prison whose 
main goal is providing a prison mainly for local economic development. Both types of 
private prisons exist to help alleviate some concerns facing the public system.
Through a literature review on public versus private prisons, as well as 
studying a proposed not-for-profit private prison proposal in Montana, the following 
questions will be addressed:
1. Are private correctional facilities a viable alternative to public run 
facilities?
2. What type of prison, for profit or not for profit, will be the most 
beneficial in assisting the public facilities with the problems they face.
In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper will review the background 
and history of private prisons. Next discussed are several important issues dealing with 
the contracting of private prisons. Then, an assessment of the viability of private 
prisons is presented. From there, the proposed not-for-profit facility in Montana will 
be introduced and discussed. Finally, an assessment o f for-profit versus not-for profit 
prisons will take place.
BACKGROUND
This growing trend towards privatizing prisons is nothing new in the history of 
the U.S. In the mid 1800s, state legislatures awarded a contract to several private 
entrepreneurs to operate and manage the first state prison in Louisiana. This was also the 
case in New York’s Auburn and Sing Sing penitentiaries (Smith 1993). Others were to 
follow, by the late 1800s it was quite common to find private prisons all over the country. 
In Texas, Michigan, California, Arkansas, and many other jurisdictions, all or part of the 
prison was privately owned and operated at one time or another (Prison Fellowship 
Ministries 1996). Although some prisons were completely privatized, most privatization 
was limited at this time. Smith (1993:2) explains, “Typically, privatization was limited:
The state leased or contracted convict labor to private companies.” Today this is still 
common, however the idea of privatization has shifted. Today privatization refers to the 
full operation o f a prison facility by a private entity.
A decision in the Virginia Supreme Court (Ruffm v. Commonwealth 1871) stated 
that a prisoner has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his 
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accord him. He is, for the time 
being, the slave of the state. The courts had a “Hands O ff’ doctrine, which meant that the 
courts refused to be a part of the operation of correctional facilities (Prison Fellowship 
Ministries 1996). Thus, private companies and the state were able to decide on their own, 
for the most part, the contract to be issued. Ideologically these prisons were supposed to 
pay for themselves as well as turn a profit for the private company and the state.
The system began to run into some troubles. As Smith (1993) explains, labor and 
business began to complain that using “unpaid” convict labor constituted “unfair” 
competition. Smith goes on to say that of equal concern to reformers, but not as important 
to politicians, was the issue of prisoner abuse. Across the country an ugly picture was 
painted. Most private prisons were poorly run and some were known to be corrupt (Diulio 
1988). At times government has permitted and sometimes encouraged private prisons to 
exploit and abuse prisoners (Diulio 1988). Moreover, testimony revealed that as late as 
1920 both Alabama and Florida were involved in convict lease arrangements with private 
firms that yielded significant financial benefits to both the firms and the prisons (Prison 
Fellowship Ministries 1996). However, state officials remained indifferent. There were 
rumors of the private interest groups buying off the state officials. Investigations into
these private systems revealed that prisoners were suffering whippings, malnutrition, 
overwork, and overcrowding. One report stated, “Conditions were so horrid that some 
inmates were driven to suicide, while others maimed themselves to get out of work or as 
a pathetic form of protest” (Diulio 1988:71). The result was public outrage. Thus, 
government regulation on abuse was implemented. However as the U.S. approached the 
twentieth century, a combined effort of labor, businesses, and reformers forced the state 
to take direct responsibility for the prison system (Smith 1993). This marked the end of 
the first era of private prisons. This era tends to be more remembered for corruption and 
abuse than it does for quality incarceration (Beiser 1997).
Both capitalism of the twentieth century and the soaring inmate populations have 
revitalized the once dead idea o f privatization. The harsh realities of the first effort of 
privatization have done little to deter this new wave. Smith (1993) explains that the shift 
to privatization in the-mid 1980s is a result of three primary forces: the ideological 
imperatives o f the free market; the huge increase in the number of prisoners; and the 
increase in imprisonment costs. Ideological imperatives of the ffee-market refers to the 
instilled American belief that the free market will provide competition to create growth 
and innovation. Thus in U.S. society, the private sector has been used for many public 
services. Diulio (1990) agrees with these conditions of shift, stating that the soaring 
numbers of inmates, the escalating correctional costs, and the widespread perception that 
public correction bureaucracies do not provide public protection, deterrence from crime, 
just punishment, and the rehabilitation of criminals in a humane and cost-effective way, 
are the main reasons for the privatization trend. In addition, prison reformers and prisoner
rights groups have found less to complain about in private facilities than in public 
facilities (Easton 1997). As each of these conditions intensifies, private correction’s 
initiatives are likely to increase. The prevailing assumption is that private corrections can 
do it cheaper and more efficiently without reducing the quality o f service. The first go 
around of private prisons in the 1800s could be considered a huge failure, however now 
they are under much more scrutiny by the press, the courts, and a wary public. This 
scrutiny can help insure many of the ideals needed for success will be intact, where they 
were absent in the 19^ century.
Public correctional facilities are facing a crisis with the increasing inmate 
population and the increasing cost o f incarceration. The reason the trend is towards 
privatization is because very few other politically or economically reasonable solutions 
exist. With private prisons becoming a reality, assessing the viability becomes 
increasingly important. The contract itself, and the issues involved with the contract are 
some of the most important aspects of a private prison project. The next section will 
examine this more in-depth.
ISSUES OF PRIVATIZING PRISONS
Privatization of prisons is a very complex process with many issues needing to be 
addressed. Most literature examines the issues of quality and cost. Although these are 
crucial areas that must be examined, other areas of equal importance should be taken into 
account. Based upon scholarly review of private prisons, a number of other key issues 
also appear to be critical to the introduction of private prisons. Issues dealing with
propriety, liability, numbers and growth, security, corruption, and more will be addressed.
As Charles Logan (1992), one of the leading researchers comparing public to 
private prisons, suggests, double standards should not be present. Many critics identify 
potential or actual problems. They also tend to raise questions about private prisons and 
then just walk away. They do not apply those same questions and concerns with prisons 
that are run by the government. “For any problems, questions, and concerns to be 
arguments against privatization, it must be shown that they apply more to private than to 
governmental prisons” (Logan 1997:1). Obviously there will be areas of privatization that 
are problematic and need improving. However, assessing whether or not the government 
has the same problem is where one can do quality, unbiased research.
The process of contracting is complex and deals with a variety o f issues. To 
assure the best possible arrangement, the state or government can follow some guidelines 
that are laid out in a report for The National Institute of Justice (Racket, Hatry, Levinson, 
Allen, Chi, Feigenbaum 1987). Following these guidelines will help insure that a 
thorough and fair contract will be awarded. Before the actual contracting process begins, 
states should undertake a detailed systematic, pre-analysis to determine if, and under what 
conditions, the contracting of a prison will be helpful to the system of corrections that is 
currently in place. On a general level, once this has taken place the actual contracting 
process can begin. Now that the process is underway, many concerns will need to be 
analyzed.
PROPRIETY
Propriety is one of the most controversial issues that private prisons face today. 
The propriety issue looks at the question: Is it proper to contract out the power to deprive 
people of their freedom? Opponents of privatization will argue that the government 
should be the only entity that is able to take away individual freedom. In moral thinking, 
they argue, it is not right to profit off of a criminal or victim’s misfortune. In contrast to 
this argument, it will shown that this is not the case for private prisons that are not-for- 
profit. In other areas of corrections, privatization has been a great success. For instance, 
since 1981 the Federal Bureau of Prisons handed over the pre-release housing to private 
companies. Some of which are for profit and some that are not. Although evaluation 
research is limited, the pre-release programs are commonly thought to be very successful 
(Thatcher 1998). The criticism that says that private companies should not have the right 
to take away personal freedom is somewhat misguided. For example, the catchers, 
convictors, and sentencers are the ones depriving the person of their freedom. The prisons 
are simply housing what the criminal justice system is sending. The important issue here 
is whether or not duly authorized punishment is any more or less legitimate when it is 
administered by the government or by a private company that has been given the contract 
from the government (Logan 1997). Why should the government only have the right to 
administer punishment? In answer to that; they should not and they do not solely have 
that right. The people of the United States delegate that authority to the government. The 
government is a representative of the people. These private prisons have to abide by the 
same laws that the government-run facilities do. As Logan states, "... it is the law, not the
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civil status o f the actor, that determines whether any particular exercise of force is 
legitimate.” An example of this could be a prison guard that oversteps his or her 
authority. Whether or not this particular guard is employed by the government or the 
private company, he or she will be reprimanded for the rules or laws they have broken.
The laws are similar because they have been contracted through the government.
Another factor to insure propriety, that Logan points out, is that wardens working 
under the contract of the state will have incentives to run the prison fairly. By doing this, 
they will enhance the legitimization, increase cooperation, lower the costs, and most 
importantly win renewal.
Although there are many arguments for the propriety o f contracted prisons, there 
are still some legitimate concerns. Most o f these are legal concerns such as: issues 
dealing with the use of deadly force, jurisdiction problems, and the anti labor 
issues(unions, salaries, hiring, firing etc.) that are threatened when a public employee 
becomes a private employee (Logan 1990). In addition to that, there may be some 
shortcuts taken by the prison to increase profits. Although most of these “shortcuts” will 
be regulated, it is possible for them to exist.
LIABILITY
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act o f 1871 clarifies that private prisons 
contractors will not be able to escape liability. Liability refers to financial or reputation 
damage as a result o f illegal or below-standard performance. According to Racket et al 
(1987) the contracting government entity will be unable to protect itself from suits
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resulting from wrongful acts of the private company it selects. This is a very important 
issue because through this law, the government will be more selective in the contracting 
process. This will prevent the contractor from making careless decisions. In addition to 
increased contractor liability, tighter regulation will occur. The government will provide 
strict regulations that must be carried out to reduce the chances o f wrong doings and 
therefore liability to them. This is a very important issue to inmate, administrative, and 
public interests.
Logan (1990) says governments can reduce their liability in several ways: by 
running prisons better, and thus avoiding lawsuits; by achieving certification, which 
greatly enhances the defense against lawsuits; by carrying insurance; by agreements in 
which the contractor defends the government in court and indemnifies it against legal 
damages; by developing extensive legal expertise and resources both for preventing and 
for fighting lawsuits; and by settling quickly out of court, which is easier for private firms 
than for public agencies.
The government and private facility can take steps to reduce liability. However it 
is crucial to the success of privatization that the government contractor, as well as the 
private entity have significant liability.
SECURITY
Security is an issue, like most others, that is important to the inmates, the 
administration, and the public. The safety of these three components is generally 
dependent on the security of the facility. Are private prisons as secure as public ones?
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Security in a private facility should be dealt with along the same lines as in a 
public run facility. From previous experiences, private facilities have stacked up well 
against public facilities. Moreover they have even shown to be more secure concerning 
escape rates (Logan 1997). One of the reasons for this is the unlikely event that the 
guards and administration will strike. A strike is likely to terminate a contract and thus 
terminate jobs. The fear of a striking officer losing his job is a harsh reality in the private 
prisons. Escapes and riots can occur when guards, who are unhappy with conditions, 
simply walk out of their jobs. Although private prisons do not guarantee that this will 
never happen, the chances are reduced because a strike or other disruption will result in 
termination of the contract and unemployment for all who work there (Logan 1997). In 
addition to riots, other security issues are escapes, crimes against other inmates or staff, 
and contraband transactions through the prison.
In the contract there is usually a set of plans to deal with emergencies.
Emergencies may be fire, riots, or a strike. For whatever the particular emergency, a 
specific plan will be ready for implementation ahead of time. This goes back to the notion 
of the state having liability. Whether it is public or private, police, state agents, and the 
National Guard provide backup to prison staff as needed (Logan 1990).
Opponents of privatization also have some valid arguments. Inadequate training 
and inexperience of staff may be a reality. These issues should be dealt with before the 
contract is arranged, but that is not always the case. Contracting can cause high employee 
turnover at transition as a result o f some of the anti-labor issues listed earlier (Logan 
1990). This is a security issue because of the changes. Not only may new staff members
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be less experienced, they also have to learn to cooperate and work with there new 
colleagues.
A big argument of privatization critics is that the facility will make security cut­
backs in order to increase profits. This is a legitimate argument. Since there is no 
production of items, profits come through efficiency and, for lack o f a better term, cut­
backs. One way to deal with this is regulation. In the contract, a security layout should be 
provided and the government should accept nothing less than what is known to be the 
appropriate level o f security. This appropriate level depends on the particular prison.
Obviously larger, maximum-security prisons would have stricter security requirements.
The worry of security can be greatly reduced. New regulations concerning 
training, technology, policy, etc. can help eliminate the idea that private prisons will be 
less secure than public facilities. Even now, there is no evidence that private facilities are 
less secure than their public counterparts.
NUMBERS AND GROWTH
This category looks at the growth of privatization. Many critics are opposed to 
increasing the number of private prisons simply because they are opposed to the increase 
in prisons in general. They argue if  we build more prisons, inevitably they will be filled.
This is a fair argument because incarcerating more people does not seem to be the answer 
to our crime problem. However, overcrowding is a major problem in our penal system 
today. Many issues are coming to a head because of inmate population increases. As long 
as the judicial system is sending them, there must be some where to put them.
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Another concern here that Logan (1997) briefly comments on, is that corporations 
that own the private prisons may become powerhil lobbyists, lobbying for harsher 
punishments in order to increase demand for their product. Right now there is a real 
demand for private prisons, due to overcrowding. However we have to be careful not to 
artificially create a larger demand. As long as there is a necessity for more prisons, 
private prisons should grow with the demand for them. In addition, groAvth and 
competition may help generate improvements in all realms of prisons. Along with the 
generation of profits, this is the whole basis of capitalism. The private sector may 
stimulate new ideas and programs that the government’s prior monopoly on prisons may 
never have developed. In contrast, it should be noted that not all competition is positive. 
Competition may also breed corruption through illegal practices that are performed to 
turn larger profits. However through strict regulations this corruption can be limited. The 
next section will elaborate on this.
CORRUPTION
Corruption is an area that played an intrical part in the failure o f the first private 
prisons. Corruption in this sense can refer to acts that are illegal, unfair, or even unethical. 
Corruption can come in many forms from inmate abuse to contracting fraud. Thus, 
careful evaluation, regarding seriousness and extent of corruption is critical. Opponents 
of privatization contend that corruption is a basic side effect of privatization. On the other 
hand, proponents argue that some corruption will likely occur, however it is nothing that 
the public prisons are not dealing with too.
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There are numerous ways in which corruption can occur. Favoritism, black-mail, 
bribery, conflicting interests, nepotism, misuse of public funds, links to organized crime, 
and more (Logan 1990). However it is necessary to point out that the abuses that occurred 
in the past came at a time when the criminal justice system as a whole was much more 
corrupt. For example, some public run facilities were profit-making enterprises to the 
same extent as those who used private contractors. In the arena today, both politically and 
legally, such corruption is highly unlikely. Logan (1997:7) emphasizes the importance of 
the idea that corruption is not solely a result o f privatization, “Political corruption is a 
corollary of government, not just of government contracting. The ingredient common to 
all instances of corruption is not private ownership, but public power.”
Corruption is a legitimate concern for the critics of privatization. However one 
thing must be understood, privatization should not be considered a corrupt area of 
corrections unless it proves to be more corrupt than public corrections. It is possible in 
some cases that a private facility will be less corrupt. This may be due to the fact that the 
managers o f these private facilities have a more vested interest in the reputation of their 
particular institution (Logan 1997).
Some opponents feel that most of the corruption and fraud may occur during the 
contracting process. To help avoid accusations of fraud, government should use a 
competitive bidding process (Hacket et al 1987). To obtain a maximum number of 
bidders, a government can:
• Advertise in major state newspapers and national correctional journals
• Develop and maintain a list of potential bidders.
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• Permit both in state and out of state, as well as both not-for-profit and for 
profit organizations to place a bid.
• Include information about the evaluation process and criteria involved to 
potential bidders.
Criteria involved can refer to:
• The organizations past experiences and success.
• The qualifications of the staff
• The proposed programs.
• The firm’s financial condition and references.
• The cost.
These are areas concerning the government’s role in the contracting process. Any 
issues of dispute should be settled before the contract is awarded.
The criminal justice system as a whole is continually working to improve these 
types o f short-comings. Since the 1800s, the system has made drastic improvements and 
is showing that it will continue to do so. Privatization is one area that may result in 
further significant improvement. This improvement may be from new ideas that 
privatization may present. In contrast, improvements may occur through a process of 
elimination. Perhaps we will learn that privatization is not the answer. If so, private 
prisons will be eliminated and the correctional system will have learned from the failures. 
From these failures, corrections can be made accordingly. Either way, privatization will 
present new options for bettering the system as a whole.
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QUALITY
The quality o f a private prison is a central and complex issue in the debate of 
prison contracting. There have been many in-depth studies (Unites States General 
Accounting Office 1996, Logan 1992, Home Office Economics 1997) produced by 
private and governmental agencies, as well as the leading researchers in the area of 
privatization. For example some leading researchers have issued statements. “ The private 
sector could hardly do worse than some public prisons in terms of quality” (Logan 
1990:56). However, this section will briefly describe and elaborate on the more general 
arguments that are being presented today by both sides for and against privatization of 
prisons.
Quality can refer to a wide variety of aspects as taken through a review of 
literature on this subject. The wide variety of aspects generally refers to prison 
conditions, staff qualifications, programs and services, security, facility design, and 
administrative leadership.
The question of quality is centered on whether private providers are able or 
motivated to provide adequate or superior service for inmates and employees ( Howard 
Society1994). With regards to prisons, quality is a key issue. A major argument by 
opponents is that these private facilities are only able to be run more cheaply as result of 
cutting comers. They argue that this can mean less and poorer quality of food, fewer 
services and programs, and cheaper labor with less professionalism and training (Logan 
1990). There has been evidence through studies in Tennesee that found a 30 percent 
negative response concerning quality in private prisons. However, in that same study
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there was a 49 percent favorable response by people directly associated with the prison. 
Advocates of contracting argue that privatizing prisons will result in a higher quality for 
both private and public prisons ( Calbrese 1993). One reason being that a private director 
has a more vested interest than a public facility director. This usually results in a higher 
quality facility. As more prisons become better quality, competition will eliminate a poor 
quality facility from the picture. This will happen because contracts are not issued or 
renewed to a facility with poor quality. Government prisons should be able to compare 
their services to those of the private sector. Currently government has nothing to compare 
itself with (Howard Society 1994). Furthermore, quality is a good source for measuring 
differences between private and public facilities. By introducing competition into the area 
of prison management, the government will be forced to have high quality services, and 
in doing so their standards may increase ( Howard Society 1994). The private sector will 
have to maintain a certain level o f quality in order to maintain their contracts. As 
capitalism has experienced in the past, the competition can promote new found 
enthusiasm and creativity to both sectors. This can involve learning from mistakes and 
lowering costs, but more importantly it may open doors to new ideas and procedures.
This is not implying that competition will create a corruption-free system. In fact, as 
stated previously, sometimes competition may breed corruption. However in an area like 
prisons that is continually searching for new ideas and possibilities, competition presents 
a more positive future than it does negative.
In studies comparing public facilities with private, the results have been mostly 
mixed. However evidence compiled from various evaluations shows that private prisons
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have a slight edge over their governmental counterparts. Figure 2 shows the quality index 
scores calculated from the official records data. The numbers refer to the quality level 
with one being the optimal level. According to Logan (1992), the study used 333 
empirical indicators o f the eight dimensions of quality were constructed for the state and 
private prisons. O f these, 131 were available for the federal prisons. This allowed a total 
of 595 pairwise comparisons among the three prisons. Each comparison was tested for 
significance and then categorized either as being “non significant” (suggesting no real 
difference between the two prisons) or as being “favorable” to one and “unfavorable” to 
the other of the pair. The Prison Quality Index was calculated for each prison according 
to the following formula: Favorable Differences+(Similarities/2)/Total Comparisons 
Another example of comparing quality was a study done comparing private 
facilities in Massachusetts and Kentucky with their government counterparts. The study 
compared a number of performance indicators. The results of these indicators were as 
follows, “By and large, both staff and inmates gave better ratings to the services of the 
programs at the privately-operated facilities; escape rates were lower; there were fewer 
disturbances by inmates; and in general, staff and offenders felt more comfortable at the 
privately-operated facilities” ( Logan 1990:57). This may be due to the fact that private 
prisons are required by contract to meet the standards of the American Correctional 
Association. Only a handful of government run prisons have this same requirement.
Logan ( 1990) explains that certification does not guarantee quality, but its requirement is 
evidence that private prisons are expected to meet high standards, and their high rate 
certification proves that they are doing so.
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Quality Index Scores
For Private, State, and Federal Prisons
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Figure 2. Quality Index Scores fo r  1995. (LIS Inc. 1996).
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COST
The United States is now one of the leading countries in terms of total people 
incarcerated. Thus we have thousands of prisons, with more continually being built. As 
noted earlier, building more prisons does not seem to be the solution to the crime problem 
in this country. Yet they are still being constructed at a rigorous pace. Privatization of 
prisons is an important issue because, theoretically, they can be built cheaper.
Some officials believe that private prisons must meet a certain standard of cost 
savings compared to government run facilities. In Florida it is seven percent and ten 
percent in Texas. With these savings the prison must still be evaluated to make sure that it 
is providing equal or superior services to public facilities. There have been many claims 
by newspapers and magazines that privatization has had savings of up to fifty percent. 
However Logan (1990) says that these articles that claim savings up to fifty percent are 
simple comparison studies that totally ignore hidden costs. He goes on to say that five to 
fifteen percent is much more realistic. Support for his statement comes from a study on 
contracting issues for private operation of prisons and jails by the Hacket et al 1987.
Certain areas of privatization are argued to be cheaper and more efficient. In 
contrast, there are also specific areas where opponents argue that there will be no savings 
and may even be more expensive. The Howard Society (1994) provides arguments for 
both sides. Proponents argue that savings will come from:
1. The business sector is better equipped to finance and construct prisons 
swiftly and inexpensively.
2. Contractors can create economies of scale by contracting across
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jurisdictions. For example, the prison in Texas is able to save money by 
contracting out extra space to places like Hawaii and Montana,
3. Contracting can greatly reduce public employee pension and benefit plans 
while also making more effective use o f personnel. Better working 
conditions and less overcrowding will also result in higher employee 
morale.
4. Privatization discourages waste and encourages material management 
without tight restrictions that the government tends to place on itself.
5. Governments tend to have hidden costs such as maintenance and staff 
training. Private prisons include these costs in contracting, thereby 
accounting for the total cost o f incarceration.
6. Unlike private facilities, governments continuously try to enlarge their 
budgets in anticipation of later cutbacks. A large budget will allow them to 
weather these cutbacks.
Opponents argue that the private sector will have many problems reducing cost, 
such as:
1. Contracting adds profit margins to the basic cost, thus resulting in more 
costly incarceration.
2. Contracting creates its own hidden costs such as; initiating, negotiating, 
managing and monitoring contracts. Termination payouts and retraining 
for displaced government workers can also be hidden costs.
3. The private sector may be involved in “lowballing”. This refers to 
underbidding each other and then raising prices in contract renewals.
4. While contracts encourage competition originally, there will be little 
competition in later phases because the government is likely to stay with 
the established.
5. Methods used by the private sector to cut costs, could also be taken 
advantaged of by the government.
In all cost analysis and comparisons there are limitations. There have been many 
different results from many different studies. Sometimes the problem is that it can be like 
comparing apples to oranges. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1996) did a 
comparison study of operational costs. They compared reasonably matched public to 
private facilities. Studies were done in California, Tennessee, Washington, and Texas.
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Four comparisons looking at operational costs were done between California, Tennessee, 
and Washington. O f these four, two had no significant differences, one had a seven 
percent difference in favor of privatization, and one revealed a private facility that was 
more costly than one public facility but less costly than another. The study in Texas was 
based on hypothetical public facilities. The result here was a 14 to 15 percent difference 
in favor o f the private facility.
Methodological problems have occurred in some studies and generalizations 
should not be made from any study. The cost of operation continues to be the most 
widely debated issue of contracting. Studies have shovm data that help both sides.
However each prison, whether public or private, is unique and should be looked at on an 
individual basis.
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?
Prisons, whether private or public, are very complex systems. Very seldom are 
any two alike. For this reason, it is difficult to compare private to public, or even public 
to public for that matter. Are private prisons a viable option to public run facilities? 
Although there are various intermediate sanctions such as pre-release housing, pre-trial 
release, drug court, and electronic monitoring, there are few correctional options out there 
for serious offenders, especially violent offenders. We must examine this question in the 
context of a system that has few other alternatives. With this context in mind, one who is 
well read and has reviewed the data can make that decision that privatization is a viable 
option. The past several pages have examined arguments for and against the concept of
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privatizing prisons. Through looking at various comparative studies and data, many
legitimate arguments can be raised for both sides. However, from the research, readings,
and personal experiences, the conclusion is that that, yes, privatization is a viable
alternative to public run facilities and the problems they face today. Charles H. Logan
(1997:1) the leading researcher on private prisons agrees:
In all my reading, and in all my discussions and debates with 
others on privatization, however, I can say with confidence 
that in no area have I found any potential problem with private 
prisons that is not at least matched by an identical or closely 
related problem among prisons that are run by the government.
Privatization raises no unique or truly new issues for prisons, 
but it does offer some new solutions.
Privatization is by no means a perfect solution to an imperfect problem. However 
at this stage in our society many problems are occurring in the correctional system.
Alternatives are continuously being sought and should continue to do so. Presently 
privatization is one viable alternative that is becoming a reality. The reality is a result of 
necessity.
SOUTHWEST MONTANA MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DETENTION CENTER
The state of Montana is at a point where there is a continual need to incarcerate 
convicts, but a lack of manageable prison space is causing a problem. The 1997 
legislature spent a considerable amount o f time trying to develop a solution that would 
create adequate capacity for correctional infrastructure in Montana. The challenge now is 
to create a timely, comprehensive alternative to contracting out-of-state prison beds using 
the tools provided by the 1997 and previous legislatures.
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The Department of Corrections (DOC) currently contracts for more than 400 
prison beds with out o f state private facilities in Tennessee and Arizona (Mclaughlin 
1998). According to DOC this number could reach 600 by the years 2001. In addition to 
this, DOC believes that it will require 60 county jail beds and 96 prison beds in a new 
unit to be constructed within the walls o f the Montana State Prison (MSP). However there 
is an uncertainty where and when the funding for this will come. Even if a 500 bed 
private facility would be constructed in the year 2000, Montana could still face a large 
under capacity problem by the next year, thus requiring more out-of-state contracting.
Projections for in-state bed need, however, appear to change on a regular basis. Latest 
forecasts show zero beds for SMMJDC and an anticipated 900 beds for the Shelby 
facility by the year 2003. (Department Of Corrections)
Not only is there a major overcrowding issue with prisons, there is perhaps, a 
bigger problem with local jails. According to several law enforcement agents during a 
public hearing in Southwest Montana, there are more warrants outstanding than jail space 
available. As a result, there is a selective service of warrants. This means that the local 
law enforcement can not serve all outstanding warrants; instead, they have to pick and 
choose who they are going to serve them to (Citizens Against Prison 1998). This is due to 
lack of space. Anaconda-Deer Lodge and Butte-Silver Bow are the counties that seem to 
be experiencing the most problems. Both counties have 80 year old jails that are 
tremendously overcrowded. The concerns for public safety and risk management require 
that these counties must act now.
Montana Energy and Research Development Institute (MERDI) and Community
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Counseling and Corrections Services, Inc. (CCCS) have developed a proposal for a 
regional facility in Southwest Montana. MERDI is a non-profit organization that was 
organized in 1974. MERDFs basic goal is to continually focus concern on the nation’s 
economic, educational, and technological improvement and develop and administer 
programs and projects based on these needs. MERDI is headquartered in Butte, Montana 
and has over 380 employees (Kovenesky et al. 1997). CCCS was formed in 1983 and is 
also headquartered in Butte. It is a non-profit corporation with the purpose of developing 
constructive incarceration alternatives for the State and local correctional systems. CCCS 
currently has over 60 full time positions as well as a large part time staff. Between the 
men’s and women’s pre-release center and new DUI offender facility, CCCS has over 
185 offenders within its operation (Kovenesky et al. 1997).
MERDI and CCCS realize that the construction and operation of this facility will 
require a variety of professional skills and services. In addition to consulting with 
individuals and companies with expertise in management of correctional facilities, this 
project will utilize the services of various planning and architectural specialists such as 
Dick Anderson Construction, Harrison Fagg and Associates, O ’Brien- Kreitzberg, and 
Robert Glass and Associates (Kovenesky et al. 1997).
The Southwest Montana Multi-Jurisdictional Detention Center (SMMJDC) will 
be a not-for-profit private entity. It will attempt a “three-point solution” This three-point 
solution includes a private prison, multi jurisdictional detention center, and private MSP 
expansion. Data shows that there is a need for all three.
The private prison would be a 500 bed private prison. House Bill 83 at the 1997
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state legislature authorized the Department of Corrections to issue a request for proposal, 
the House Bill issued the following time table;
7/1/97 Request for Proposal begins
10/1/97 Request for Proposal issued
4/1/98 Proposals due
6/1/98 Contractor selected; construction begins
6/1/99 Construction complete
10/1/99 Operational
In retrospect, this timeline was viewed as unrealistic by the administrators of the 
SMMJDC. The delay in the passage of HB 83 coupled with stringent construction 
deadlines prohibited the projects timely completion.
A multi jurisdictional detention center is authorized by Title 7 Chapter 32 part 22, 
Montana Code Annotated. This act known as the Detention Centers act authorizes two or 
more local governments to enter into an agreement with a private entity to provide, 
maintain, and operate a detention center. This detention center will hold an additional 75- 
100 inmates. Anaconda-Deer Lodge and Butte-Silver Bow counties have agreed on such 
a facility.
Montana State Prison Expansion is a project that would expand the facility at 
Deer Lodge by 192 beds. This would help eliminate some of the existing overcrowding 
problems. Since federal funding for such a project may not be forthcoming, it makes 
sense to have a private party design, finance, and construct the expansion. After doing so, 
the private company could then lease the facility back to the state.
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FINANCING
When developing a proposal for a private prison, the issue of financing is as 
important an issue as any. The Southwest Montana Multi-Jurisdictional Detention Center 
will propose to issue revenue bonds. There are various approaches of financing through 
the use o f revenue bonds. In this case, D.A. Davidson handles the issuance of the 
industrial bonds, where they are sold in New York(Thatcher 1998). A public hearing to 
determine whether there is sufficient public interest also must be conducted. Obtaining 
the bonds is done by pledging the revenues generated fi*om the lease and use agreements 
of the facility. This corrections facility is confident that it can deliver the state of Montana 
a per diem rate that is less than the current out of state costs.
FACILITY
The SMMJDC will be a state of the art facility with the ability to hold 580 federal, 
state, and local inmates. It will have a central building surrounded by three to four smaller 
buildings. Each smaller building will be connected to the main building. This is a village 
style concept which will allow maximum security at cheaper construction costs.
Advanced security and monitoring technology will be utilized. The facility will contain 
living, educational, dining, recreation, and treatment areas. In addition to this, the facility 
has been designed to allow further expansion if deemed necessary in the future.
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STAFF
The SMMJDC will employ 130 full-time and well trained-staff. This diverse staff 
includes security officers, case managers, counselors, psychologists, support staff In 
addition to these staff members, a group administrator will be employed to provide 
direction and support in the day to day operation of the facility. The facility will also 
employ an executive director whose requirements are a bachelors degree (masters 
preferred) and at least ten years experience. Various part-time employees will be hired as 
seen necessary (Kovenesky et al. 1997).
TREATMENT and PROGRAMS
Every inmate that is entering this facility will be assigned his own treatment team.
This team will include several counselors as well as a case manager. The team and the 
inmate will work together to develop a program that will best benefit the inmate and the 
public.
Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT). This is a program used by various public and 
private prisons throughout the nation. The program is designed to promote positive self- 
image and self identity, help inmates leam positive social behaviors and beliefs, and help 
them make decisions based on higher moral judgement. This is generally accomplished 
through systematic self evaluation and goal setting activities.
Educational and Vocational Programs. For any inmates interested, pre and post 
GED training and instruction will be provided. Inmates also have the option of 
participating in educational and vocational programs. These programs may take place at
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the facility site, Butte Vo-tech, and even Montana Tech of the University of Montana.
Libraries, classrooms, and computers will be provided at the facility. In addition, an on 
site group of educators will provide and coordinate the specific programs.
Industry Programs. In collaboration with the MSP, the SMMJDC will work on 
the development o f industrial programs. The premise of this program is to help inmates 
contribute to the cost o f their incarceration, while providing some financial retribution to 
the victims o f their crimes. Inmates may also create some financial savings that will help 
them when released.
Psychological and Addictive Services. The facility will employ two full time staff 
psychologists who will provide resident and staff evaluation and counseling services.
Trained and certified staff members will be available to provide addiction counseling and 
recovery programs. The programs used will be specifically geared toward the criminal 
justice system.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT VERSUS FOR PROFIT
The SMMJDC is only the second correctional facility to experiment with idea of a 
privately run prison that is not pursuing financial profit or gain. Thus comparing and 
analyzing data between for-profit and not-for-profit is difficult. This section will 
examine the first and only other not-for-profit facility that exists. In doing so, similarities 
between that facility and the proposed SMMJDC are discussed. In addition, advantages 
and disadvantages of a not-for-profit compared to a for-profit are examined.
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THE APPLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
The concept of a not-for-profit private correction facility was originated by Mr. 
Bob Thompson (1997) for the city of Appleton, Minnesota. The city opted for the not- 
for-profit prison because it could not find any financing for a for-profit prison venture. 
The city formed a corporation for the development of the prison called the Appleton 
Prison Corporation. This facility is fully accredited by the state and the American 
Corrections Association.
Financing and Construction. The city of Appleton issued bonds for the entire 
start-up and construction of the facility. These bonds were revenue bonds, not 
government obligation bonds. The construction phase of the project was approximately 
20 months. Other state contracts including Colorado and Puerto Rico provided funding 
for operation o f the facility (Thompson 1997).
Public Reaction and Support. According to Mr. Thompson (1997), the attitude 
was initially mixed about the concept of a not-for-profit prison in the region. However, 
after the Appleton Prison Corporation and the local government communicated the 
economic impacts and the need for a solution to the overcrowding problems, the public 
supported the project. The communication to the public was done through an extensive 
marketing campaign highlighting both economic and social benefits of the project.
Problems. The facility encountered some problems which the SMMJDC can leam 
from, including:
• The not-for-profit did not have a good relationship with the Minnesota
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Department of Corrections. “The situation was a political nightmare” 
(Thompson 1997). Initially Minnesota did not have any inmates in the facility. 
That situation has since changed and the state contracts regularly with the 
facility.
Many states could not contract with the facility for the housing of inmates. At 
that time few states had the statutory authority to contract for housing 
prisoners. This situation has changed. Initially the facility took inmates from 
Colorado and Puerto Rico. There was a significant communication problem 
with the inmates from Puerto Rico which caused both financial and public 
relation problems.
The staff was very “green” and inexperienced.
The facility had a difficult financial situation in the beginning. This situation 
resulting in failure to pay the bond holders. Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA) made a bid to buy out all the existing bond holders. The 
successful buyout resulted in the facility becoming completely managed by 
CCA. However it still remains not-for-profit.
Inmate Programs. The facility offers a well-rounded program of services , 
including many educational programs, for the inmates. The facility is currently a satellite 
campus for one of the technical colleges in an area. Thus, the facility has a full-time fully 
accredited teaching staff. The quality of the services demands a higher per-diem than 
other private and government facilities. In addition to educational programs, the facility 
provides several rehabilitation programs as well as a number of organized recreational 
activities.
Growth. The Appleton Correctional Facility started out with 516 beds and 170 
employees in 1987. It is currently in the process of expanding up to 1003 beds and 350 
employees.
Recommendations. Mr. Bob Thompson recommends:
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• Get commitment contracts from potential parties. These parties would include 
the Marshal’s service, the state, and local counties. He stated that commitment 
contracts are a bargaining tool with potential financing sources because they 
want to make sure they will get some return from their investment.
• Make certain potential contract parties have the statutory authority to contract. 
Do not limit statutory requirements to the state. Make certain that cities and 
counties possibly using the facility also have the capacity to enter into 
contracts for the purposes o f jail services. County/city ordinances statutes are 
a good source of this information. It could take time to change laws or create 
laws if they are not already in place. For this reason, make sure to start early.
• Form a positive relationship with the Montana Department of Corrections as 
soon as possible. This relationship is imperative not only for the start-up of the 
facility but for its continuation.
• Do not be afraid to charge a higher per diem than other entities if you are 
providing superior services. Sell what you have!
SIMILARITIES
The Appleton Facility and the SMMJDC have some important similarities. For 
this reason, the Appleton model has been used as a helpful tool in decision making 
processes for the organizers of the SMMJDC. Similarities are prison size, public reaction 
and support, financing, and most importantly a not-for-profit approach.
As previously stated, the Appleton facility started out with 560 beds and 170 
employees. The SMMJDC is planning on 600 beds between the prison and county jails 
and over 140 employees. At one point, the SMMJDC was considering an 1100 bed 
facility as recent as January of 1998. However, the organizers realize that this is a very 
complex task and too much too soon could have very negative results. However 
expansion will still be an option in the future.
The Appleton facility had a mixed public reaction to the prison. The SMMJDC is
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experiencing very similar reactions. The majority of public feedback has been in favor of 
the prison. However there has been some significant opposition. The feedback generally 
was voiced at a serious o f public hearings. The public hearing process was a real learning 
experience for both the proposers and the community at large. The State of Montana has a 
very specific procedure to allow for citizen input. This procedure not only involved a 
series of public hearings but necessitated the approval o f the local city councils. Although 
the procedure was followed closely and there was initially overwhelming support, there 
was a last-ditch, well organized, effort to derail the project.
At a recent a public hearing several issues were raised by the group opposing the 
prison. They felt that, although there would be initial economic benefit from the 
construction and new employment, the prison would, in fact, hinder future economic 
growth. They felt the community would be labeled a “prison town” and this would 
discourage other companies looking to relocate. Unless the prison itself expanded, they 
did not feel its presence would encourage the creation of new jobs in Anaconda. They 
also argued that the very presence of a prison would negatively impact already 
established businesses. They specifically felt tourism and recreational operations (sking, 
fishing, boating, etc.) would absorb the bulk of the impact. There final argument was 
based on the specific prison location and the fact that people entering the community of 
Anaconda would first see the prison and immediately form a negative impression. The 
group was adamant about the project being forced down the communities throat and was 
calling for a delay in the decision or a completely new site location. It appeared the 
project was splitting the community and causing serious internal problems. Many public
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comments were becoming personal in nature and seemingly unrelated to the issue at 
hand.
As the problem began to unfold over the next two weeks the opposition called for 
a community vote to determine support or opposition to the project. The developers 
strongly opposed this suggestion, citing time constraints and the fact that they strictly 
adhered to all public comment requirements. In addition, they had the support of the city 
councils from both Butte and Anaconda. When it was obvious a county-wide vote would 
not be taken, the opposition employed a private poll taking organization to get a “feel” 
from the community. The independent poll showed a 70 percent favorable response to the 
project and its proposed location. This apparently has quieted the opposition but shows 
how a proposed prison can often divide a community. More importantly, it demonstrates 
the necessity of sound, objective community involvement.
Financing for the SMMJDC is consistent with the Appleton facility in that its 
main source of money will come through revenue bonds. Contracts from other states, in 
addition to a variety of other financing options are continuously be being sought and 
evaluated. Revenue bonds will be responsible for the large task of construction and start 
up of the facility.
The greatest similarity between the two prisons is that they are not out to gain a 
profit. This is very significant because they are the only two existing not-for-profit private 
prisons in the U.S. This similarity resulted in much of the other similarities between the 
two. The Appleton facility had experienced some difficulties early in its existence, but 
has been flourishing since its buy out by Correction Corporations of America. The
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SMMJDC plans on learning from the Appleton facility and avoiding some of the 
problems they went through. In contrast, the SMMJDC will emulate some of the 
Appleton’s successes. In certain areas the SMMJDC can leam from other private prisons 
as well as take innovative steps in developing a successful private prison. However the 
Appleton facility, as a model, will provide valuable information that only a not-for-profit 
can provide to a proposed not-for-profit.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A NOT-FOR-PROFIT APPROACH 
The not-for-profit approach to privatizing prisons is a new concept that has only 
been in existence since the late 1980s. In addition to the brief period of operation, the 
small number (one) of these types of prisons has made it difficult for any comparative 
analysis with private prisons for-profit. However, with a new private not-for-profit in the 
works and a growing success of the Appleton facility, it will be of great value to do a 
comparative analysis. This comparison will be similar to the format used to compare 
private prisons, as a whole, with public run facilities. In addition to this, there will be 
some issues addressed that concern only private prisons.
When comparing public to private it is important not to have any double 
standards. The same rule applies when comparing not-for-profit versus for-profit.
Obviously there will not be as much discrepancy between these two types of private 
prisons as there is among public versus private. On the other hand, enough difference 
exists for an analysis to take place.
The next section will examine the same issues used to assess public versus private
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prisons. However in this section these issues will be used to assess not-for-profit versus 
for-profit. In addition, other issues of importance will be presented and assessed.
PROPRIETY
The propriety of a not-for-profit prison is the strongest argument in favor of 
creating such a facility, whereas it is a very controversial issue when looking at public 
versus private. The propriety of a not-for-profit helps alleviate some of the negative views 
that generally accompany a privately run prison proposal.
Another controversial issue that is somewhat put to rest with a not-for-profit 
prison is the idea o f someone profiting off of another’s misfortune. The idea of 
misfortune may refer to the victims of the crime or the offender’s misfortune. This tends 
to be more of a moral issue than that of a political or economic one. Yet it is still a big 
argument for opponents o f privatization. Since, a private facility makes money by the 
state contracting prisoners to their facility, the more prisoners the more money. This 
could create some conflict of interest problems between the courts and these private 
facilities that are out to make a profit. The not-for-profit approach, again, alleviates much 
of the concern of making money off o f crime.
LIABILITY
The issue of liability is a major concern for the government because they are 
largely responsible for the private contracts. By the government holding more 
responsibility, a more selective process will take place. This will generally favor a not- 
for-profit facility because of many of the propriety issues that will need to be dealt with.
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However this does not mean that a not-for-profit will have any less liability than a for- 
profit. It simply means that a not-for-profit will have the advantage of winning the 
contract. One reason being, a for-profit prison is a more vulnerable target for lawsuits 
since it is profit making enterprise.
SECURITY
Security is an issue that is fairly even when comparing for-profit against not-for- 
profit. One argument may be that some of the cutbacks to create more profits may result 
in less or poorer quality security. One of the biggest concerns of a private run facility is 
the cost-cutting measures that will be taken in order to produce a profit. These so called 
“cutbacks” or “shortcuts” may come in many different forms. Perhaps a for-profit prison 
will reduce the amount o f programs available to the inmates, make cutbacks on insuring 
the safety of the inmates and the public, or reduce the quality of services it provides. This 
is not a central concern for a not-for-profit prison because providing a first-class high- 
quality prison is the main objective. This is not to say that the not-for-profit will turn 
away from making a profit. It simply means that it is not on its list of top priorities, 
whereas it is the number one priority o f for-profit prisons. This is a valid argument; 
however security will be an area cutback only as a last resort for both types of private 
prisons. Renewing the contracts with the state is of great importance for a private facility.
One of the first areas that will be examined in this renewal process is security. Thus, 
cutbacks or shortcuts in security for either type of facility is unlikely.
39
NUMBERS AND GROWTH
Growth of private facilities appears inevitable. The big issue now for government 
contractors is whether or not they should contract to a not-for-profit before a for-profit.
As mentioned earlier, these private entities that own the private for-profit prisons may 
become powerful lobbyists. Thus they will lobby for harsher punishments in order to 
increase demand for their products (Logan 1990). Creating more prisons and 
incarcerating more people is not the answer to our crime problem. Thus, construction of a 
private prison should only take place on an as needed basis. There should not be more 
incarceration of people because there is the ability or capacity to build a private prison to 
accommodate them. Not-for-profit prisons are there to help with the problems that the 
state prisons are facing and help develop the local economy. They are not here to make 
money by doing everything they can to get more prisoners. Many opponents of 
privatization believe that this is the case for private for-profit prisons. However a not-for- 
profit facility significantly limits their argument here.
CORRUPTION
The opponents of privatization believe that corruption is a basic side effect of 
prison privatization. Although corruption played a large part in the first private prisons, 
steps have been taken to limit the amount of corruption that will occur in the present 
situation of privatization. Moreover a not-for-profit private prison will likely reduce more 
skepticism that still exists. Corruption can take a variety of shapes and forms. Corruption 
of both private and public correctional systems in the U.S. could be a paper in itself.
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However, due to the premise that a not-for-profit is not concerned with making money off 
of incarcerating people, corruption is likely to be lessened from that o f a private system 
whose main focus is on turning a profit.
QUALITY
Quality o f a prison refers to looking at the services it provides for inmates and 
employees. Private prisons are being run more cheaply than public. If they were not 
cheaper, then they would not exist. Critics argue that the ability to run the prison cheaper 
comes from lowering costs and cutting comers. This may mean that the quality, in a 
variety o f areas, is less than it is in a public mn facility. Quality Index Scores 
(Kovenesky, Thatcher 1997) shows that this is not the case. Critics are falsely accusing 
private prisons of less quality.
A not-for-profit does not guarantee a higher quality of prison than a for-profit 
private facility. However based on the similarities and differences between the two, the 
logical argument is that a not-for-profit will naturally provide better quality. Quality costs 
money and more money spent means less profits, thus quality for a not-for-profit will 
likely be higher than that o f a for-profit.
COST
The cost of a private facility compared to a public facility is generally cheaper.
Further, the cost of a private not-for-profit should be cheaper than a private for-profit 
facility. This is primarily do to tax breaks associated with the not-for-profit status. In
41
SMMJDC’s case their 501C-3 non-profit designation means that they do not have to pay 
any property taxes (Thatcher 98). Hidden costs may be present in each type of private 
prison, however this is more of an issue concerned with the specific prison itself and not 
one that should be generalized to a not-for-profit or a for-profit.
It must be mentioned that all prisons, private for-profit or not-for-profit, are 
different and should be treated that way. Some generalizations can be made. However we 
should remember that these are generalizations that have not been supported by an 
abundance of empirical evidence. On the other hand, this analysis does have value. It 
gives a good idea of the overall picture among these big issues that all private facilities 
will have to deal with.
Not only does this analysis consist of the main issues, but also from the 
experiences of the SMMJDC. Through research, interviews, and personal experiences, 
other conclusions can be made about the benefits of a not-for-profit appraoach for the 
SMMJDC. These areas o f help may or may not be limited to the SMMJDC.
Economic Development. The main focus of the SMMJDC, other than dealing 
with the overcrowding of the Montana State Prison, is helping the local economy. Old 
mining counties of Silver Bow and Deer Lodge will be the main beneficiaries of the 
prison. These counties, which were once predicted to be ghost towns by now, are now 
experiencing a steady growth. The development of this prison will help insure that this 
growth continues steadily into the new millenium. The prison itself will provide an 
abundance of jobs, most o f which are better than average paying compared to state 
prisons (Citizens Against Prisons 1998). Correctional officers with SMMJDC would
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start at $8.50 to $10.00 per hour while the state starts at $8.00 per hour. SMMJDC is able 
to offer higher salaries because the design of the facility allows for greater staff 
efficiency. According to Mike Thatcher, (1998) administrative positions would meet or 
exceed state salary levels. Also the non-profit status mandates any profits be returned to 
the operation of the facility. In addition to this, construction of the prison will provide a 
large amount of work that is considered very significant to communities the size of Butte 
and Anaconda.
The prison will directly affect the local economy by creating jobs, in addition to 
this, it will indirectly catalyze the economy by encouraging more families to come to the 
area. Families o f the workers and inmates will provide more consumerism in the area.
A private for-profit facility would also help stimulate the local economy. However 
there are many areas that a not-for-profit, whose focus on economic development, will 
give back to the communities. This will not likely be the case with a prison focused upon 
making a profit.
Donations. Receiving donations may be an area where the SMMJDC is unique. A 
tightly knit area such as the Butte/Anaconda area has certain advantages over others.
Known for “sticking together” people generally want to see things happen for the good of 
the whole. Donations were made in all aspects o f the prison from preparing the proposal 
to financing the construction. However the biggest advantage that the SMMJDC has is 
that the land was donated. The proposed land is a 160-acre tract of land at the intersection 
of Highway 48 and Highway 1 near Anaconda. As a result of not having to pay land 
acquisition costs, SMMJDC and its operations subcontractor CCCS will offer facility
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employees better employment wage and benefit packages. This donation of land was 
crucial in finding a site, as well as financing the prison. Due to EPA constraints, this 
prison site had to be abandoned. As of September of 1998, SMMJDC is actively pursuing 
the operation of a smaller facility to be located on the Warm Springs campus. They are 
reviewing a site that would house 144-200 state prisoners and 90 jail prisoners. SMMJDC 
is guardedly optimistic that they can be operational within the next 12 months.
Team Effort. The efforts of not-for-profit agencies such as CCCS and MERDI are 
the reason that this prison will become a reality. A not-for-profit has an advantage of 
putting this all together because of the ability to work within a team concept. Neither 
agency could have accomplished what has been done without the other. A for-profit 
entity generally works alone in developing a prison. The job is apparently being 
accomplished by the for-profit prisons. However, through the team effort that the 
SMMJDC has engaged in, the transition from idea into reality will be a much smoother 
process than if it were a for-profit prison.
Passing Legislation. In Montana the idea of a large-scale private prison was not 
easily accepted. Many of the directors of the SMMJDC proposal believe that if it were 
not a not-for-profit proposal it would have been rejected. Once again, the idea of someone 
profiting off of another’s misfortune is hard to accept for some people. The not-for-profit 
proposal alleviated this controversy and shows that the prison is in the best interest of the 
state and local counties.
Public Support. Much like the passing of the proposal in the legislation, the public 
support was affected by the not-for-profit approach. Early, a small portion of the public
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voiced loud opposition. It is believed that the public support would have been in favor of 
the prison regardless o f whether or not it was profit oriented. On the other hand, the 
support was not likely to be as lopsided in favor of the prison. This may play a crucial 
role in future private facility proposals where preliminary public support is divided or in 
favor o f not building a facility. Marketing is the key tool in gaining or losing public 
support. In addition to a well devised marketing strategy, a not-for-profit approach is 
crucial to gaining additional support.
Department o f Corrections. It remains to be to be seen what type of relationship 
the SMMJDC will have with the DOC in the future. Currently the relationship is good 
and there is optimism about the future. The DOC likes the idea of a not-for-profit facility, 
but their main concern is quality prisons.
Funding. Funding is one of the few areas that tends to be a disadvantage for a not- 
for-profit facility. The financial situation is very important to a proposal. To put it 
simply, private for-profit facilities usually finance the prison themselves with a hope of 
gaining more than they put in. This can be a problem for not-for-profit agencies. The 
issuing of revenue bonds is the trend for these not-for-profit prisons. As seen with the 
Appleton facility some problems can be created. The SMMJDC was lucky enough to 
receive some financial help through donations, especially the land. However revenue 
bonds will play an important role in the financing. With a careful financial plan and early 
success, the prison will be on track to have financial viability and prosperity.
Again, it is important to emphasize that all prisons are different. A not-for-profit 
approach, in my estimations, will increase success on the previous issues. An analysis is
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never a guarantee, but it can be a helpful guide.
DISCUSSION
The not-for-profit approach to privatizing correctional facilities is a new concept
that seems destined for success and growth. There are rumors of two new not-for-profit
facilities being built in the U.S. However, they are still only in pre-pre-proposal stage.
Since there is currently only one not-for-profit in actual operation at the present time, the
prospective performance of the SMMJDC is going to be crucial to the future of not-for-
profit private prisons. The SMMJDC is looking forward to the challenge of being a
pioneer. Mike Thatcher, executive director o f CCCS, has an optimistic view of the future
direction of the facility.
I think this is a great opportunity for us. We get to be one of the 
first two prisons in the world of this kind. The future of not-for- 
profit privatization significantly depends on our successes and 
failures. I think the directors, organizers, and committee 
members responsible for developing this are all confident in the 
capabilities we posses. With that in mind, I believe we will see 
the emergence of several not-for-profit facilities in the next ten 
years or so (Thatcher 98).
Many experts, not only view private prisons as the wave of the future, but see more 
not-for-profit prisons as inevitable. Some say, not-for-profit prisons will never out­
number for-profits because we live in a capitalistic society that values making money.
However through a combination o f public, private for-profit, and private not-for-profit we 
will be able to better deal with our correctional problems. In addition, as each of these 
types o f prisons expand and grow we can do more thorough comparisons and see if one is
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better than the rest.
SUMMARY
This paper’s intent was to review and assess the potential for private not-for-profit 
prisons. This included an assessment of whether private prisons are a viable option to 
public run facilities. In addition, an analysis of two different types of private prisons was 
conducted: prisons for-profit and prisons not-for-profit.
As defined by Logan (1990:27), a private prison is a place o f confinement that is 
privately owned, operated, or managed under control by the government. The U.S. had an 
earlier experience with privately run prisons in the 19* century. However, the first 
experience was deemed a failure. Investigations into these early private facilities 
revealed, horrid prison conditions, prisoner abuse, and political corruption. As the 
twentieth century approached, a number o f factors led to the abolition of the private 
prison.
A variety of reasons led to the rebirth of privatization in the mid-1980s. Among 
these reasons are the imperatives of the free market (principles o f capitalism), escalating 
correctional costs, and public prison overcrowding. Private prisons are slowly but surely 
expanding as we proceed into the next century.
As privatization continues to grow, the question must be raised whether private 
prisons are a viable option to public run facilities. A review of relevant research and 
comparison articles helped develop a format consisting of seven issues. The issues are: 
propriety, liability, security, numbers and growth, corruption, quality, and cost. It is
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important to remember when doing a comparison that double standards should not exist.
For criticisms to exist against a private facility, it must be shown that these criticisms 
apply more to private facilities than public. With this in mind, it was determined that 
private facilities are a viable option to public run facilities.
The Southwest Montana Multi-Jurisdictional Detention Center is a proposed not- 
for-profit private prison that is currently in the pre-construction stages. An in-depth 
evaluation and description of this prison is given to show an example of the not-for-profit 
approach. In addition the Appleton facility in Appleton Minnesota was also briefly 
described. These are the only two not-for-profit privately run facilities. The SMMJDC 
benefited from using the Appleton facility as an example of what to do and what not to 
do.
Since it was determined that privatization is a viable option to public prisons, the 
question now is which type of private prison is the best for the future. The comparison of 
for-profit versus not-for-profit followed the same format that the public versus private 
did. However, there were some additional areas that were also examined. It was 
determined, that as a whole, not-for-profit prisons have some advantages over for-profit.
This does not infer that all not-for-profit prisons will be better than for-profit. It simply 
means that the basic premise of the not-for-profit prison is a more solid approach.
/ A
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